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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the legal facilitation (or rather lack of facilitation) of gifts. The emerging 
western political ideology of welfare is based on the premise that nonprofit organisations are to 
play a far greater role in the delivery of welfare services. This role will be enabled in part by 
increased gifts. The ideology has not addressed the fundamental hostility of the law to the 
facilitation of gifts.  The nature of the legal obstruction of such gifts is compared to equivalent 
commercial transactions, the reasons given for this obstruction are analysed and the 
appropriateness of such nonfacilitation is challenged. A state that does not alter the legal 
hostility to gifts may find that organisations do not attain their expected role in the changing 
welfare state. 
 
This paper examines the legal facilitation of a direct gratuitous inter vivos1 property transfer 
(gift) from a donor (one who transfers property) to the donee (one who ultimately receives 
property). For example, the paper addresses the question, what is the legal conception of A 
giving a gift of food to B? For this analysis, it matters little who the parties to the transaction are, 
be they individuals, charitable2 or for profit entities. It does not include transactions that are not 
directly given to the donee, but are to be passed through an intermediary to a donee. The legal 
analysis of intermediaries is more complex with different issues.3
 
 
Examples of intermediaries are the executors of a deceased person's estate,4 trust or community 
organisation receiving property to hand on to donees, usually according to conditions.5
                                                     
     1 Inter vivos refers to a gift made during the donor's lifetime (Latin: between the living). It is used to distinguish a 
gift made after death which has a special and complex set of laws. 
 
Charitable intermediaries can also be donors and donees in different transactions where they are 
not performing an intermediary function. For example where a person gifts property to a 
charitable organisation without any conditions as to its use, the charitable organisation is a 
donee. When a charity gifts a piece of property to another without condition that it be passed on 
     2 The word "charitable" is used in this paper, unless the context otherwise dictates, in its popular meaning, that is 
a nonprofit, non-government, voluntary, donative organisation, it is not used in its restricted legal meaning flowing 
from common law or statutes. 
     3 These issues revolve around how the entity carries out its functions as an intermediary between the donor and 
donee. It includes such specific matters as the way in which it holds title to the property and how the fidelity of the 
intermediary to the donor is ensured. 
     4 If a donor wishes to transfer property after death, this must be through an intermediary, as the former donor's 
property is not within the donor's control or possession at that time. After death a donor ceases to exist and their 
wishes must be carried out by another, usually as a trustee, executor or administrator. These are treated as 
intermediaries in this paper. 
     5 These conditions might be that the property is to go to a particular class of persons for a particular purpose. It 
would also include the condition that the property is only to be used for the purposes of the intermediary and not for 
the profit of the controllers or members of the intermediary. 
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to others, it is acting as a donor in a direct gift. 
 
The emerging western ideology be it known as reconstitution of civil society, modernisation, de-
modernisation, shadow state, corporatisation or even economic rationalism expects charitable 
organisations to play a far greater role in the delivery of services.6
 
 Part of the funding for this 
shift is to come from increased voluntary action. This has taken for granted that the law 
facilitates voluntary action, particularly gratuitous property transfers such as gifts. If the law 
places a barrier to the gratuitous transfer of property the presumed policy outcomes may not fully 
eventuate. 
Analysis of gratuitous transfers in their own right is not a novel proposition for either traditional 
legal or economic scholars. It has gained attention from traditional contract law scholars as a 
"puzzle".7 Fuller8 and Posner9
 
 typify those mostly American scholars who have examined the 
inter vivos gratuitous transfer from a functional economic perspective. What is uncommon is the 
analysis of direct gratuitous transfers to and by charitable organisations. It is when economists 
and lawyers have turned to examine charitable intermediaries that the role of the gratuitous 
transfer has been neglected. 
Anglo-Australian economic scholarship of charitable intermediaries can be illustrated by Culyer, 
Wiseman and Posnett, English scholars who attempted an economic rationale of charitable 
activity using the concept that  
 
                                                     
     6 This interpretation of social welfare is adopted by a number of scholars such as J.R. Wolch, The Shadow State: 
Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition, The Foundation Center, New York, 1990; A. Ware, Between Profit 
and State: Intermediate Organisations in Britain and the United States, Polity Press, 1989; L.M. Salamon, `Of 
Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third Party Government: Toward a Theory of Government-Nonprofit 
Relations in the Modern Welfare State', Journal of Voluntary Action Research, Vol.16, No.1-2, 1987, pp.29-49; 
H.K. Anheier & W. Seibel (ed.), The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations, Walter de 
Gruyter, Berlin, 1990; D. Billis & M. Harris, `Taking the Strain of Change: U.K. Local Voluntary Agencies Enter 
the Post-Thatcher Period', Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol.21, No.3, 1992, pp.211-225; M. 
Considine, `The Costs of Increased Control:  Corporate Management and Australian Community Organisations', 
Australian Social Work, Vol.41, No.3, 1988, pp.17-25; R. Kramer, `Voluntary Organisations in the Welfare State:  
On the Threshold of the 90's', The Centre for Voluntary Organisations, London School of Economics, Working 
Paper No.8, London, 1990; C. Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? A new Political Economy of Welfare, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 1991; H.K. Anheier & W. Seibel, The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit 
Organisations, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1990; R. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State, University of 
California Press, 1981. 
     7 K.C.T. Sutton, Consideration Reconsidered-Studies on the Doctrine of Consideration of the Law of Contract, 
University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1974; Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, Vol.8, 1973, pp.3-28; B. Coote, `The Essence of Contract', Journal of Contract Law, Vol.1, 
No.2. pp.91-112 and Vol.1, No.3 pp.183-204 are examples of such work. 
     8 L.L. Fuller, `Consideration and Form', Columbia Law Review 799, Vol.41, 1941, pp.799-824. 
     9 R.A. Posner, `Gratuitous Promises in Law and Economics', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.6, 1977, pp.411-426. 
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 The legal treatment of charities is seen as a logical extension of the laws of contracts and 
inheritance.10
 
  
They noted that, 
 
 Thus philanthropic transactions, in common with all other transactions involving 
the transfer of property rights, require the protection of a system of law to enable 
contracts between individuals to take effect and be enforced,11
 
 
but do not go on to examine the gratuitous exchange or acknowledge that the law does not 
"protect or enable" such contracts. They concentrated their work on the facilitation of the 
intermediary performing its intermediary function. American economic scholarship of charitable 
intermediaries has also not seriously addressed this issue.12
 
 
The charitable organisation has been the sole focus of traditional English legal texts on charity 
such as Tudor on Charities or The Modern Law of Charities13 and other texts.14
 
 They do not 
deal adequately, if at all, with the legal nature or implications of direct property transfers 
between donors and donees and the implications for charitable organisations. Their focus is 
exclusively on the legal implications of the trust in its intermediary function and consequently 
excludes valuable insights that a critical analysis of gratuitous inter vivos property transfers can 
reveal. For example, Chesterman writes, 
 In the smallest, simplest communities, philanthropic welfare provision can 
frequently take this simple form of direct almsgiving. No bureaucracies or other 
                                                     
     10 A.J. Culyer, J. Wiseman & J.W. Posnett, `Charity and Public Policy in the UK - The Law and the Economics', 
Social and Economic Administration, Vol.10, No.1, Spring 1976, pp.32-50. 
     11Culyer et al, ibid, p.33. 
     12 For example Hansmann in his two leading articles on nonprofit corporations (H.B. Hansmann, `The Role of 
Nonprofit Enterprise', The Yale Law Journal, Vol.89, No.5, 1980, pp.835-901 and `Reforming Nonprofit 
Corporation Law', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.129, No.3, 1981, pp.497-1050) does not examine 
the law/economics of donations nor does B.A. Weisbrod (B.A. Weisbrod, The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector: An 
economic Analysis, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1977; The Nonprofit Economy, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988). The analysis of gratuitous transfers by American scholars outside the context of 
gratuitous intermediaries has been substantial, (see footnotes Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark 
not defined.). 
     13 G. Spencer, Maurice & David B. Parker, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1984; and 
G.W. Keeton & L.A. Sheridan, The Modern Law of Charities, 2nd ed., Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly Inc., 
Belfast, 1971. 
     14 See, for example, E. Cairns, Charities: Law and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1988; F.M. Bradshaw, 
The Law of Charitable trusts in Australia, Butterworths, Sydney, 1983; M.R. Chesterman, Charities, Trusts and 
Social Welfare, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1979. 
 
 
 4 
organisational structures need to be interposed to facilitate the flow of material 
benefits from giver to recipient; in addition, an express or implicit requirement that 
the latter should show homage or deference in return can be easily communicated.15
 
 
Although Chesterman is correct in stating that intermediaries are not necessary for a transfer of 
property, facilitation of such transfers may still be required. It is argued that this facilitation is 
not in the form of a bureaucracy, but a more basic requirement of legal recognition and 
promotion of the gratuitous exchange. He does not acknowledge the hostility of the law to gifts. 
It will be argued that the state of traditional legal scholarship is a reflection of the classificatory 
division in the English common law between equity and assumpsit.16
 
 
The first part of the paper identifies the actual lack of legal facilitation of the gratuitous transfer 
compared to a commercial transaction. The method to facilitate gratuitous promises to transfer 
property is to formalise the transactions by using a deed under seal (which was the medieval 
commercial practice) or symbolic consideration. It will be argued that forced recourse to these 
devices is pure formalism and creates anomalous situations. In comparison with the 
contemporary state of the law in America, which facilitates the enforcement of gratuitous 
promises, the systemic dysfunctional judicial attitude towards gifts in Anglo-Australian law is 
even more sharply focused. 
 
It is argued that the Anglo-australian law's treatment of such gratuitous property transfers suffers 
from formalism and its development was stunted in the nineteenth century against the 
background of laissez-faire economic and libertarian political philosophies, which are 
inappropriate to the modern welfare state. The support of the current state of the common law by 
functional economic scholars is also examined and challenged. The assumptions underlying the 
rational construction are challenged and a new functional paradigm proposed. This provides a 
basis for reform of the stagnated morass of legal conceptions that overbear the gratuitous inter 
vivos property transfer. 
 
The law's response to completed gifts 
 
The direct property transfer in its simplest form may be expressed in terms of A, a natural person 
delivering a loaf of bread to B, another natural person. This is a purely philanthropic transfer, a 
gift, which occurs where the transfer of property is voluntary and for no tangible gain to the 
                                                     
     15 Chesterman ibid, p.2. 
     16 The law of trusts being found in Equity and the law of individual gratuitous transfers being a matter entirely for 
assumpsit (that is, contract law). One writer notes, "Though a branch of public law, charitable trusts are commonly 
treated in general textbooks on trusts, alongside private trusts, presumably because (they, sic) developed in equity." 
L.A. Sheridan, "Nature of Charity", The Malayan Law Journal, December, 1957, pp.lxxvi-xcix at p.lxxvi. 
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donor17
 
. At common law an effective gift of property requires that: 
(a) the donor had an intention to part with the property; 
(b) the subject matter was certain; 
(c) the donor must be able to dispose of the property; 
(d) the donor must employ the means recognised by the common law as necessary to transfer 
the property; 
(e) the donee must be capable of acquiring the property; and 
(f) the donee must accept the property18
 
. 
In terms of the example, if the bread is given from one to another as a gift, satisfying the above 
requirements, the law recognises that the bread belongs to B. At first scrutiny the requirements 
of the common law seem rational, prudent, consistent with the legal framework and societal 
expectations. However the law is distinctly reluctant to facilitate the transfer in ways that have 
been developed for commercial exchanges of property.  
 
The common law will not lend its support to rectify a defective transfer of the property, or 
default in some other warranty or condition made by a donor19
 
. Put in terms of the example, if 
the bread was not A's to transfer, then the law would enforce the return of the bread to the 
rightful owner, but B would have no remedy against A either for the replacement of the bread or 
recompense due to the defective transfer. B would have no legal remedy if the bread was 
warranted by A to be fit for human consumption and was not in fact so.   
Donees cannot be compelled to accept a gift, but that approximates all of their rights20
                                                     
     17 A gratuitous transfer, gift or philanthropic action must be distinguished from a commercial property transfer. A 
gratuitous transfer is unilateral, the donor receives no market price or tangible quid pro quo in return for the transfer 
of the property. Some of the literature seeks to construct in a gratuitous transfer some return, price or value flowing 
from the donee back to the donor to turn it into an exchange relationship (see T.R. Ireland, The Calculus of 
Philanthropy, in the Economics of Charity, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1969, pp.65-78 and W.M. 
Landes and R.A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, "Good Samaritans, and other Rescuers:  An economic study of law and 
altruism", The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.7, 1978, pp.83-128).  The difference between a gift and a bargain 
adopted in this paper is derived from the work of Atkinson (R. Atkinson, "Altruism in Nonprofit Organisations", 
Boston College Law Review, Vol.31, No.3, pp.501-639) and Hall & Colombo (M.A. Hall & J.D. Colombo, "The 
Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption", Ohio State Law Journal, Vol.52, 1991, pp.1379-1476). The 
distinguishing feature is whether the value of the return is independent of the transaction itself, if so it is a unilateral 
gratuitous transfer of property, a gift. 
. A, the 
     18 See Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd [1917] A.C. 406 at 436 and Re Wasserberg: Union of London and Smiths 
Bank Ltd v. Wasserberg [1915] 1 Ch 195. 
     19 The type of contract referred to in this section is the parol or simple contract which forms the vast bulk of 
contracts made. The contract formed by a deed under seal will be dealt with in text accompanying footnote Error! 
Bookmark not defined.. 
     20 See Dewar v. Dewar [1975] 2 ALL ER 728. 
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donor is similarly in a weak legal position.21 The common law would also not enforce 
conditions or directions of the donor as to the purpose for which the property was to be applied 
by the donee, or its free disposition once it was in the hands of the donee22
                                                     
     21 This legal position ought not to be confused with the moral power or actual power of a donor over a donee. 
. For example an 
imposed condition by A that the bread is to be used to feed B rather than be sold to provide B 
with addictive substances would not be enforced by the common law courts. 
     22 A concise authority for this proposition is to be found in Lord Parker's judgment in the case of Bowman v. 
Secular Society Limited [1917] A.C. 406 at 436-7. 
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All these remedies may have been available if the transaction was not a gift but a bargain, that is, 
that the law could point to consideration supporting the transaction. The concept of a bargain or 
"consideration" is essential to English contract law recognising a parol contract, that is, a legally 
enforceable agreement23
 
. Consideration is an abstract legal concept used to signify the presence 
of a mutual exchange and common law chose to only enforce mutual exchanges. Gifts were 
perceived as unilateral exchanges and hence were not enforced. The perception of the law that a 
gift involves no mutuality is a crucial issue will be examined later in this paper. 
The Law's response to incomplete gifts 
 
The situations presented so far have been gifts that have been legally completed, that is, the 
donor has done all that is necessary to legally transfer the property to the donee. The law will not 
disturb a completed transaction provided that there are no other vitiating circumstances.24
 
 Where 
the transfer is not complete or where there is an executory promise to transfer a gift, then the 
general principle is that the transfer will not be enforced by the common law or equity. This is in 
direct contrast to commercial transactions supported by consideration, which will be enforced by 
the common law and equity. The legal function of enforcing promises is an important facilitation 
of commerce and one could hardly imagine our present society functioning without this facility. 
Yet, this facility is in the most part denied to gratuitous transferors. 
The attitude of the common law is illustrated in the case of In re Hudson. Creed v. Henderson.25
 
 
The judge made an opening comment that,  
 I believe this is the first time in the annals of the Court of Chancery, or of the Court 
which has succeeded it, in which an attempt has been made, and made against a 
dead man's estate, to make it liable for a promise given by him during his lifetime to 
make a charitable contribution to any object.26
 
   
Mr Hudson had promised verbally to give 20,000 pounds to a church and then signed a form 
whereby he promised to pay the sum in four equal instalments for the purpose of liquidating 
                                                     
     23 The English common law requires consideration to enforce a promise, that is in the oft quoted words of Lush J 
in Currie v. Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153 at 162 "either some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, 
or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other" for a parol or 
simple agreement to be enforceable.  Formal contracts such as those of record (for example, judgements and 
recognisances entered into the records of the courts) or contacts under seal (that is, contracts that are deeds under 
seal) do not require consideration to be present. 
     24 These are fraud, duress or undue influence which are discussed text accompanying footnote 63 and following. 
     25 (1885) 54 LJ. CH. N.S. 811. 
     26 Pearson J., ibid, (1885) 54 LJ CH N.S. 811 at 814. 
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"chapel debts." The promisor paid 12,000 pounds before his death and the church sought to 
recover the outstanding sum from the promisor's estate.   
 
The church's case was based on the notion that the money was a legal debt owed by the estate to 
them, due to the testator having a legally enforceable contract with the church. The judge found 
that Mr. Hudson's actions were voluntary, there was no consideration and so no contract. The 
church had argued that consideration was present in the form of reliance by the church on the 
donation, and further reliance in that others would only make a donation in consequence of 
Hudson's promise. The church had also incurred expenses and liabilities that it would not have 
incurred but for the promise of the testator. This was not accepted by the judge saying, 
 
 I am bound to say that this is an attempt to turn a charity into something very 
different from a charity. I think it ought to fail, and I think it does fail. I do not know 
to what extent a contrary decision might open a new form of posthumous charity. 
Posthumous charity is already bad enough, and it is quite sufficiently protected by 
law without establishing a new principle which would extend the doctrine in its 
favour far more than it has been extended or ought to be extended.27
 
 
This line of reasoning was followed in later English cases28, but the arguments raised by the 
church would have satisfied an American court29
 
. 
The Australian courts have closely followed English precedent.30 A recent Australian case that 
deals with these issues is the New South Wales Court of Appeal case of Beaton v. McDivitt.31
                                                     
     27 ibid, at p.815. 
 
Kirby P, adopted the conventional English notion of consideration noting that he was bound by 
     28 In re Churchill. Taylor v. University of Manchester [1917] 1 Ch. 206; In re Cory. Kinnaird v. Cory (1912) 29 
T.L.R. 18; In re Soames. The Church Schools Company (Limited) v. Soames (1897) 13 T.L.R. 439. 
     29 Refer text accompanying footnote Error! Bookmark not defined. and following. 
     30 See such cases as Phillips v. Bennett (1866) S.A.L.R. 75 where in 1866, the Full Court of the South Australian 
Supreme Court regarded the action by a school trustee to recover a sum of four pound ten shillings from a defaulting 
donor to the construction of a class room, as nudum pactum. J. Gwynne commented at p.76 that, "... such a promise 
to the Trustee or persons collecting money, however binding in point of morals, has no force whatever in law, being 
without consideration." The matter was again considered in The National Trustees Executors and Agency Company 
Limited v. O'Hea and others (1904) 29 V.L.R. 814.. The case involved the will of Monsignor O'Hea who was a 
Dean of the Roman Catholic Church and certain claims made against the estate as the result of incomplete gifts. The 
Supreme Court was referred to a number of American cases which supported the contention that consideration could 
be present in a gift situation. The Victorian Court said,"Conceding that English Courts would give relief upon the 
same equity, it should certainly be given cautiously, and only in cases which left no doubt of a distinct promise, and 
of action clearly induced by the promise. The facts before me fall short in this respect..." (Beckett J. at p.822). 
     31 (1987) 13 NSWLR 162. This case involved the status of a promise from a land owner to a person to allowing 
occupation of part of the land. A transfer of title to the occupier was to occur on the happening of an event that was 
eventually frustrated. One of the issues was that there was no conventional consideration involved in the bargain. 
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the High Court of Australia's statement of consideration in the case of Australian Woollen Mills 
Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth.32
 
 He rationalised the adoption of the English concept of bargain 
on the grounds that,  
 People make foolish and ill considered promises to confer gifts and benefits on 
others ... In the cold light of the dawns that follow, disputes require courts to decide 
whether these promises will be enforced.33
 
 
It is a revealing remark and illustrates the entrenchment of the English precedent in Australia. 
Kirby P has the deserved reputation of one of Australia's most reformist judges having spent 
many years as head of the federal law reform commissions and delivering many adventurous 
judicial decisions and indicates the entrenched attitude of the courts.34
 
  
Where consideration is lacking in commercial promises, resort could be had by the parties to 
rendering their promises into the form of a "deed under seal." In the early history of English law 
this form had to be used in order to give validity to executory contracts35. A deed under seal 
originally required that the promise be placed on parchment or paper, sealed by the promisor, 
delivered as a deed that has been witnessed and attested.36
 
 Best, C.J. said in Morley v. Boothby 
that, 
 The common law protected men against improvident contracts. If they bound 
themselves by deed, it was considered that they must have determined upon what 
they were about to do, before they made so solemn an engagement; and therefore it 
was not necessary to the validity of the instrument, that any consideration should 
appear on it.37
 
 
Thus the general principle of English law is stated as, 
 
                                                     
     32 (1954) 92 CLR 424. 
     33 op cit, Kirby P. at p.169. 
     34 To illustrate this point see, W.L. Morrison, `The Activism of Mr Justice Kirby: reforming the laws with 
unreformed theory', Quadrant, Vol.29, No.2, 1985, pp.53-57; R. McGeock, `Tribute to Mr Justice Kirby, former 
solicitor now president of NSW court of Appeal', Law Society Journal, Vol.22, No.1, 1984, pp.774-775; P.J. 
Downey, `Australian Judges', New Zealand Law Journal, 1984, pp.353-354; K.D. Kirby, `The Seven Deadly Sins', 
Brief, Vol.13, No.7, 1985, pp.28-29. 
     35 A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1987, pp.88-90. 
     36 Goddard v. Denton (1584) 2 Co. Rep. 4b; 76 E.R. 396. 
     37 Morley v. Boothby (1825) 3 Bing. 107 at 111-112; 130 E.R. 455 at 456. 
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 ... if an individual wishes to bind himself by gratuitous promise, the rule that all 
simple contracts require to be supported by the presence of consideration forbids 
him to implement his intention otherwise than by deed. If he complies with this 
formality, he will doubtless be made to pay damages should he break his promise.38
 
  
Rendering the gift into the form of a deed is not however a complete solution to legal 
enforcement. The equitable remedy of "specific performance" is not available to enforce a gift in 
any legal form, deed or otherwise. This is illustrated in the firm words of The Lord Chancellor in 
the case of Wycherley v. Wycherley,39
 It is certain that, in general, courts will not compel the performance of voluntary 
agreements. An agreement, in its nature, imports a reciprocity, and a quid pro quo, 
and where that reciprocity does not exist, the power of enforcing it does not exist. ... 
I know of no instance where a court of equity has compelled a man to execute what 
was a mere act of volition. 
 
 
This position was retained still a century later when Lord Justice Knight Bruce in Kekewich v. 
Manning40
 
 said, 
 In equity, where at least the covenantor is living, or where specific performance of 
such a [voluntary] covenant is sought, it stands scarcely, or not at all, on a better 
footing than if it were contained in an instrument unsealed. 
 
The law of equity will intervene under certain limited circumstances to provide some relief to a 
donee who has not had perfect title vested in them by a donor. This has not always been so. 
Before the nineteenth century it was not at all beyond doubt that a declaration of trust could be 
effective though gratuitous transfers41. The pre-nineteenth century view was that "no court of 
conscience will enforce donum gratuitum, though an intent appear so clearly, where it is not 
executed or sufficiently passed by law".42
 
 
There has been a continuing argument in equity as to whether an attempted gratuitous transfer 
that was not complete at law could be rectified by equity looking to the intention of the donor. 
The equity courts have to choose between two competing maxims, "Equity follows the 
                                                     
     38 G.C. Cheshire & C.H.S. Fifoot, The Law of Contract, Butterworths, Sydney, 1966, at p.103. 
     39 1763 2 Eden 175 at 177-178; 28 E.R. 864 at 864-865, emphasis added. 
     40 (1851) 1 De G.M. & G. 176 at 188; 42 E.R. 519 at 524. 
     41 See Ex parte Pye (1811) 18 Ves. Jun. 140; 34 E.R. 271. 
     42 Bacon, Reading on the Statute of Uses (Works, Spedding (ed.)), J. Stephens, London, Vol.7, 403. 
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[common] Law" and "Equity looks to the intent rather than the form."43 The equity courts 
applied the strict view that in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, the 
settlor must have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in 
the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property and render the 
settlement binding on him.44 This has been eased in the English case of Re Rose45 where by the 
use of a constructive trust, unknown at the time of the previous cases, if a donor has done all that 
the donor alone can do then the equitable title vests in the donee and the donor holds the legal 
title for the donee until such time as all the steps have been completed and the legal title vests in 
the donee. It is not clear whether this relaxation of the principle has been adopted in Australia as 
there has not been a case on the point.46
 
 Here equity has used a fictitious intermediary entity to 
over come the problem. This only serves to highlight the comments made at the beginning of 
this chapter about the fixation of equity and equity scholars, with intermediaries. It is a 
cumbersome solution to the problem and is not without doubt as to its applicability in Australia. 
The other possibility of the development of Anglo-australian law to assist gratuitous promises is 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel was used extensively to permit 
American courts to break away from English precedent to enforce gratuitous promises.47 
Estoppel allows the court to intervene in the unjust departure by a party from an assumption of 
fact which that party has caused another party to adopt or accept for the purpose of the legal 
relationship.48
                                                     
     43  H.A.J. Ford & W.A. Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts, The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1990, at 
p.110. 
 English, and Australian courts more so, have been reluctant to extend this 
doctrine as far as it has developed in the United States. The doctrine cannot be used as a weapon, 
only a shield, which is a defence to an action which limits its use in enforcing a gratuitous 
promise. To go further would, in the High Court of Australia's opinion, directly threaten the 
doctrine of consideration, as a gratuitous promisee could make a promise binding by acting on 
     44 Turner L.J. in Milroy v. Lord (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 264 at 274; 45 E.R. 1185 at 1189. 
     45 In Re Rose. Rose v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1952] Ch. 499. 
     46 Obiter dicta in several Australian cases do not bode well for following the English precedent, see Windeyer J. 
in Norman v. F.C.T. (1963) 109 C.L.R. 555 at 602-3 and Olsson v. Dyson (1970) 120 C.L.R. 365.. Kitto J. at 375, 
with whose judgment Menzies J. agreed in the case of Olsson v. Dyson said: "But there is no equity to perfect an 
imperfect gift: because the absence of consideration a purported assignment, if incomplete as a legal assignment, 
effects nothing in equity". This view has been altered by statute in various jurisdictions to give effect to the clear 
intentions of donors, such as Section 200 of the Queensland Property Law Act. 
     47 Refer to text accompanying footnote Error! Bookmark not defined. and following. 
     48 See further Dixon J. in Grundt v. Great Boulder Gold Mines Pty Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641. An example would 
be if A leases a house to B at $10 a month, but because of some factor A and B agree (without fresh consideration) 
for a period of time that the rent is reduced to $5 a month, then at the end of the period A cannot sue for the balance 
monies. 
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it.49
 
  
The law as it currently stands in England and Australia does not facilitate gifts. It stops short of 
prohibiting such transfers by not interfering with a completed transfer without any vitiating 
elements.50 The concept of common law consideration and the reluctance of equity to depart 
from this has resulted in donors and donees being placed in an impossible position to enforce 
their agreement by recourse to the courts. The law has not developed significantly through either 
of the possible avenues of fictitious intermediaries in the form of trusts or promissory estoppel. 
In a time of rapid change and public policy of welfare being premised on voluntary action,51
 
 
what will be the effects if the law takes several centuries to accommodate altered social 
circumstances? 
As will be seen later in this paper it is not the position in the other major western legal systems, 
such as the civil law countries in Europe or the United States of America. Before looking for the 
reasons behind the dominance of consideration and whether this is appropriate for a modern 
welfare state, another aspect of consideration requires to be introduced. 
 
In the terminology of the law, the common law courts would assist to enforce a transaction 
where there is "sufficient but inadequate" (symbolic) consideration. A property may be 
transferred for a grossly inadequate value such as a peppercorn or a hairpin and the court will 
lend its aid to enforcing the promise.52
 
 The traditional rationale for this policy position is that the 
philosophy of freedom of contract requires that courts not interfere in matters of commercial 
judgement which is best left to the parties. The courts have also resiled from the prospect of 
examining the price of each contract to establish whether it is adequate, perhaps a daunting task. 
Thus if A promised to transfer a loaf of bread to B in exchange for a speck of dust, the court 
would enforce the promise. The court would not probe the adequacy of the exchange. This is a 
device used to make apparent gifts legally enforceable. It is common in Australia for leases of 
property to nonprofit entities to be for a nominal sum such as one dollar or the settlement of a 
trust for ten dollars. 
While consideration need not be adequate, it must be "sufficient," that is it must be recognised as 
of some value in the perception of the law. There are several categories of motivations that are 
                                                     
     49 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v. Maher (1988) 76 ALR 513. 
     50 These are fraud, duress and undue influence that will be discussed later, refer footnote Error! Bookmark not 
defined. and following. 
     51 Refer to footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
     52 See Thomas v. Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851; 114 E.R. 330 where one pound annual rental for a house was 
sufficient consideration and Chappell & Co Ltd v. Nestle Co Ltd [1960] AC 87 where used chocolate wrappers could 
be consideration. 
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not regarded as sufficient consideration53, but the one which often relates to gifts concerns moral 
obligations. A moral obligation, such as natural love and affection is regarded of no value to the 
law.54 Holdsworth remarks that "Quite why the courts adopted this general principle is nowhere 
stated."55 Equity again follows the common law on this point in that it will not deny a party 
remedies because the value is less than may be expected or inappropriate.56
 
 
This boundary of the commercial bargain produces the result that a donee who gives up in reality 
some thing of minor worth is in a better position than one who relies solely on generous motives. 
The other issue that provides some odd results is the law's distinction between conditional gift 
promises and a contract. As previously noted, if A promises to gift B a loaf of bread, there is no 
contract, it is but a gift. If A promises to give B a loaf of bread after B fetches it from the 
cupboard, there is still no consideration and hence no contract. The fetching of the bread is not 
the price of the promise, but a condition precedent to the operation of A's gift. If A promises to 
give B a loaf of bread in return for B bringing a loaf of bread from the cupboard, there is a 
bargain, as the act is stipulated for the price of the promise.57
 
 There is an exchange in both 
instances, but the law will not recognise the enforceability of both exchanges because of the 
adherence to the principles of consideration. The common law assumes that the exchange is the 
hallmark of a transfer that ought to be enforced for the good of society. As has been mentioned 
this view of the world does not consider the altered nature and importance of gratuitous transfer 
in contemporary society nor certain types of exchanges nor reliance or intention of the parties to 
a gratuitous transfer. 
Law and contractual intention 
 
Direct gifts, even if supported by symbolic consideration, can still be unenforceable because of 
the intention of the parties. The common law presumption is that social or domestic 
arrangements are not intended to create contractual relations and will not be enforced by the 
courts58
                                                     
     53 The other categories are the performance of an existing contractual duty owed to the promisor and the 
performance of a public duty. 
. Agreements between husband and wife, family members or nonrelations in a domestic 
context will be presumed by the court not to have intended to create a legally binding agreement 
unless there is a positive and unambiguous indication to the contrary.  
     54 See Eastwood v. Kenyon (1840) 11 AD & EI 438; 113 E.R. 482, which is the most cited references in modern 
texts, but the proposition was stated much earlier in Harford v. Gardiner (1587) 2 Leo. 31 which overruled Hunt v. 
Bate (1856) Dy. 272; 73 E.R. 605. 
     55 Holdsworth, ibid Vol.3, p.434. 
     56 Haywood v. Cope (1858) 25 Beav. 140; 53 E.R. 509; Mountford v. Scott [1975] Ch. 258. 
     57 See the cases of Dickinson v. Abel [1969] 1 ALL ER 484 and Wyatt v. Kreglinger & Fernay [1933] 1 KB 793. 
     58 See Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571 or a more recent example in In Re Gonin (dec'd) [1977] 3 WLR 379. 
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If A (husband of B) gives to B a loaf of bread for symbolic consideration, there is no issue with 
consideration, but the courts would presume that this social or domestic transfer of property is 
not intended to be enforced by the law. If the parties could show some contrary intention such as 
attending a solicitor to draw up a formal agreement, the courts may  enforce the agreement. This 
is a direct contrast to commercial arrangements which will be presumed to be legally binding 
unless their are positive indications to the contrary.59
 
 
The judgments in the case of Balfour v. Balfour60
 
 which involve an agreement between husband 
and wife indicate that public policy concerning the administration of justice was a prime concern 
of the judges, Atkin L.J. saying that, 
 the small Courts of this country would have to be multiplied one hundredfold if 
these arrangements were held to result in legal obligations. 
 
he went on to say that, 
 
 Agreements such as these are outside the realm of contracts altogether. The 
common law does not regulate the form of agreements between spouses. Their 
promises are not sealed with seals and sealing wax. The consideration that really 
obtains for them is that natural love and affection which counts for so little in these 
cold Courts61
 
. 
It is acknowledged that most domestic agreements are not those which society wishes to place 
before its judicial system. This doctrine reinforces the common law's view of consideration as 
relating only to commercial arrangements. We will reserve the public policy justifications for 
further comment. 
 
Judicial Intervention for public protection 
 
Despite the common law's reluctance to enforce gratuitous transfers as contracts between donors 
and donees, it does intervene in such transfers to protect donors from the consequences of their 
actions. The strand connecting these instances is that the circumstances of the transfer offends 
the basic tenets of justice and fairness. Undue influence62, unconscionable conduct63
                                                     
     59 Refer Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424. 
 and 
     60 [1919] 2 KB 571. 
     61 at p.579, Duke L.J., also expresses the same sentiments at p.577. 
     62 Undue influence finds its roots in the equitable doctrine that influence by a person over another should not be 
abused and that confidence `reposed' should not be `betrayed'(See Smith v. Kay (1859) 7 HLC 750 at 779; 11 ER 
 
 
 15 
duress64
 
 are all grounds for relief of donors from transfers so tainted. 
The law provides protection for donors against transfers that are regarded as unfair. There has 
been no corresponding development of protection for donees. The protection alluded to here is 
not protection of transfers, as donees by definition have none. The law could seek to uphold 
fairness considerations relating to the transferred property. Some situations may be the state of 
the property, be it defective or property that may cause harm, property that is onerous in terms of 
attaching obligations65
                                                                                                                                        
299 at 311). Certain relationships will raise a presumption of undue influence in a transaction and the onus of 
rebutting the presumption is on the dominant party. Judicially recognised relationships in which the presumption will 
be presumed are: parent and child (See Bank of New South Wales v. Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42); guardian and ward 
(See London and Westminster Loan and Discount Co (Ltd) v. Bilton (1911) 27 TLR 184); trustee and beneficiary 
(See Wheeler v. Sargeant (1893) 69 LT 181); solicitor and client (See Westmelton (Vic) Pty Ltd v. Archer and 
Shulman (1982) VR 305); physician and patient (See Williams v. Johnson [1937] 4 All ER 34); and religious adviser 
and advisee (See Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145). 
, or fails to perform the intended purpose at all or satisfactorily. 
 
Undue influence may also be claimed outside these relationships, but the weaker party must establish at the time of 
the gift that the dominant party had actual influence over the weaker's mind. Undue influence will also extend to the 
situation where a third party uses undue influence to effect a property transfer between the weaker party and another 
(See Powell v. Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243). The court will set aside the property transfer. 
     63 "Unconscionable conduct" has for centuries been a ground for equitable remedies based on the wider notion of 
equitable fraud, rather than common law fraud. Where a stronger party has dealt with a party with a special disability 
such as illiteracy, age, infirmity or ignorance unfairly, the onus is on the stronger party to show that the dealing was 
fair and just (See Mason J, in Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio (1983) 57 ALJR 358 at 363). A donor who 
has gifted property to a donee in a stronger position than the donor may have the transfer rescinded if the donee 
cannot prove that the transfer was fair. There appear to be no cases where the donor is in the superior position to the 
donee, and one can only imagine that it would arise in the situation where the transfer of property was accompanied 
by onerous obligations on the donee to the benefit of the donor. 
     64 Duress, a common law concept, also permitted relief to weaker parties where consent to an agreement was 
obtained by an illegitimate threat, coercion or force. Where property has been transferred as a result of threats of or 
actual violence to persons or property then the courts will assist to reverse the transfer. The law would intervene, 
whether or not there was a binding contract, to permit recovery of property (See T.A. Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v. Emm 
Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd (1956) 56 SR (NSW) 323). 
     65 For example a mortgage, rental conditions or tied service contracts to the donor. This ought not to be confused 
with donor conditions attempting to be attached to the gift which the law will not enforce. Mortgages and leases will 
run with real property independently on donor conditions by force of the law. 
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Donors are twice protected; once through consideration and again by the vitiating circumstances 
that the law will remedy. One may ask, is the gratuitous transfer so prone to fraud, perjury, 
misunderstanding and regretted hasty decisions due to unconscionable emotional pressure that 
this double protection is warranted? This is an issue that will be taken up for comment later in 
this paper. 
 
Comparison with the treatment of inter vivos gifts in Continental and American Law 
 
There is no such requirement of consideration in the Continental law codes of France and 
Germany, consideration is not formally recognised as part of their legal system of enforcing 
contacts or agreements. In Roman law those who promised to make gifts could be compelled to 
complete them although the donor later resiles from the promise and no consideration was 
necessary66
 
. Dawson comments that: 
 In our own laws the starting point is that most promises of gift are wasted words, 
and it is only their performance that counts, so that the gift is conceived as a one-
sided act - a transfer in which the transferor holds all the controls. In western 
Europe a different way of thinking has come to be a habit. In what we might be 
called the Romanesque tradition, a gift is conceived as a two-sided transaction, a 
contract which, like any other contract, requires mutual consent...67
 
 
Like English law, the promise could not be open-ended and condition potestative (a condition 
wholly subject to the promisor's control) was void.68 The French and German codes typify the 
general thrust of continental law in this matter requiring that the agreement be notarised, a 
document executed by the donor, accepted by the donee and actual transfer of the property.69 
These are much more onerous requirements than those of the English tradition. Dawson posits 
that this is due to the Roman and Continental preoccupation with succession and `forced 
heirship', but notes that it has the advantages of ensuring "deliberation, informed consent and a 
full public record through the active participation by a trained public official."70
 
 
                                                     
     66 J.P. Dawson, Gifts and Promises Continental and American Law Compared, Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London, 1980, p.23. The contract form was classified as nude pact and could be enforced in the secular 
courts. Such agreements in the last two hundred years to the end of the reign of Justinian were required to be 
registered, mainly to facilitate tax collections, but also to provide authentication and facilitate enforcement. 
     67 Dawson, p.2. 
     68 French Civil Code, art. 1174; and A.T. Von Mehren, `Civil Law Analogues to Consideration', Harvard Law 
Review, Vol.72, pp.1024-1026 (1959). 
     69 Dawson, specifically p.213 and generally chapters 2 & 3. 
     70 Dawson, p.226 and see also p.229. 
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American judges have been far more adventurous than their English or Australian counterparts 
in developing techniques to enforce transfers of property to donees. They have overcome many 
hurdles that the English conception of consideration placed in the path of enforcing gratuitous 
transfers. American law has a long tradition of favouring, on a public policy stance, such 
transfers which would have traditionally failed because of a lack of consideration.71 Justice 
Harris in Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company72
 
 after noting the difficulty of 
enforcing gratuitous transfers said: 
 Yet, the courts have generally striven to find grounds for enforcement, indicating the 
depth of feeling in this country that private philanthropy serves a highly important 
function in our society. 
 
Professor Shattuck commented as early as 1937 that, 
 
 No more interesting instance of judicial legislation is to be found in the books. Our 
courts have taken it upon themselves to make certain that no subscriber to charity 
escapes paying his subscription.73
 
 
This desire has driven judges to find consideration on various tenuous grounds. Transfers have 
been enforced on the basis that the donee promises to use the property for charitable purposes.74 
Cohen points out that the nonprofit organisation is bound by the objects of its constitution and 
the nondistribution constraint to do so in any case, so there is no real promise made.75 In other 
cases the argument has been that other donors have contributed in reliance on the promise by the 
particular donor and the mutual promise affords good consideration.76 A moral obligation has 
been found to be consideration for the enforcement of a gratuitous transfer77
                                                     
     71 A.L. Corbin, `Corbin on Contracts, A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law', Section 
118 (West ed. 1965); Kenneth P. Cohen, `Charitable Subscriptions - Is consideration necessary?', Baylor Law 
Review, Vol.26, 1974, pp.256-261. 
 and the equitable 
doctrine of promissory estoppel is also used. If the donee has in reliance on the promise altered 
their position such as expending money, incurring a liability, performing services, then 
     72 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974). 
     73 W.L. Shattuck, `Gratuitous promises - a new writ?', Michigan Law Review, Vol.35, 1937, pp.908-945 at 931. 
     74 In re Lord's Will 175 Misc. 921, 25 N.Y.S.2d 747, 151 A.L.R. 589. 
     75 ibid 256-7. 
     76 Such authorities are summarised in the case of G.B. Jordan et al., v. Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami 
Inc., a Florida corporation not for profit 276 So.2d 102 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
     77 Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. 416 (1846). 
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consideration will exist.78
 
 It has been criticised in the following terms: 
 Courts should act with restraint in respect to the public policy arguments 
endeavouring to sustain a mere charitable subscription. To ascribe consideration 
where there is none, or to adopt any other theory which affords charities a different 
legal rationale than other entities, is to approve fiction. 
 
 The wisdom of such a policy, its possible detriment as well as its benefit to public 
bodies, may be the subject of legislative inquiry and decision.79
 
 
A bold step is contained in the Second restatement of Contracts in which enforcement of 
charitable subscriptions can be achieved without consideration or detrimental reliance.80
 
 A 
promise which the donor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the donee will be enforced if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 
Unlike other types of promises the court does not have to inquire whether the promise actually 
induced action or forbearance on the part of the donee. This allows the allegation of reliance by 
the donee to be enforced by the court without investigation and avoids the problem of mixed 
motives. 
Novack discusses many organisations that are seeking to enforce promises of property to 
nonprofit organisations in the American courts.81
 
 American judicial decisions have facilitated 
the enforcement of gratuitous property transfers. This could be directly attributed to the greater 
flexibility of the American judiciary to accommodate perceived public policy and the historical 
importance accorded to philanthropic activity. It is a stark contrast to the English and Australian 
legal relationship between donors and donees. 
                                                     
     78 Some case examples are Doyle v. Glassock, 24 Tex. 200, 58 S.W. 152 (1859) and McKeon v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 206 Iowa 556, 221 N.W. 351, 62 A.L.R. 1006. 
     79 Jordan v. Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami Inc., op. cit. at 108. 
     80 The Second Restatement of Contracts  Chapter 4 P90(2) takes the position that 
 
 (1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.... 
 
 (2) A charitable subscription .... is binding under Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced 
action or forbearance. 
     81 Janet Novack, Forbes, 29 October, 1990, p.68. One case she mentions was before the courts seeking $12 
million on behalf of nine charities from one estate as the result of unfulfilled pledges. The American broadsheet The 
Chronicle of Philanthropy while profiling presidential candidate Ross Perot's philanthropy mentioned several threats 
of legal action concerning Perot gifts. (The Chronicle of Philanthropy, June 16, 1992 pp.7-11.) 
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Analysis of the Anglo-Australian position 
 
So far this paper has described the contemporary legal state of Anglo-australian law which it is 
argued does not facilitate the gratuitous transfer of property in the same manner as commercial 
transfers. The method to facilitate transfers is to formalise the transactions by the use of a deed 
under seal or symbolic consideration. These devices still do not give the legal facilitation that is 
accorded commercial transfers. It will be argued that forced recourse to these devices is pure 
formalism and creates anomalous situations. In comparison with the contemporary state of the 
law in America, the systemic dysfunctional judicial attitude towards gifts in Anglo-Australian 
law is even more sharply focused. 
 
The following analysis addresses the question, what explanations can be offered for the 
difference? This question is important to consider as it exposes the forces that shaped the law as 
it now stands and assists to understand why contemporary socially desired and encouraged 
transfers are faltering. The first discipline that is used to explain the state of the law is that of 
history, it offers insights into the policy issues that have influenced judicial attitudes towards 
gratuitous transfers. The second discipline is that of economics which is found to offer 
rationalisations and a context for the way that the common law has developed. A closer analysis 
of the attitudes present in the law's assumptions in the treatment of gratuitous transfers leads to a 
restatement of the function of the law of gratuitous transfers in terms of social facilitation. 
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Historical Analysis 
 
A fundamental of English contract law has been its emphasis on freedom of contract; that is, 
"freedom to contract and to negotiate contractual terms; it assumes a paradigm situations of one-
to-one negotiation of all of the terms of an agreement by the parties with equal bargaining 
strength concerned to maximise their individual positions."82
 
  One unfamiliar with the actual 
position of gratuitous promises would perhaps assume that these agreements too were left to 
parties to negotiate, unhindered duly by the law. This general observation does not fit the law's 
treatment of gratuitous promises. Why might this be so? There are several possible reasons, the 
first is that gratuitous promises fell outside the origins of contact law (unlike the civil law) and 
the conceptual boundaries were never expanded (as they have been in America) to include such 
transactions. 
Consideration has its historical roots in the common law actions of debt, covenant and assumpsit 
and by borrowing the Roman law's idea that a nude pact was not enforceable.83
 
 In the thirteenth 
century only those agreements that could be brought within the form of the common law's 
personal actions such as debt or covenant would be entertained before the common law courts. 
The essence of these actions rested not on promises but that a duty had arisen from status, 
relations or a tangible transaction of property. The notion that a promise itself was enforceable 
independent of a duty was to come much later in English legal history. These forms of action did 
never include gratuitous conduct as did the Roman law. With debt, the duty arose from a person 
having property that was to be transferred because of quid pro quo. A promise was finally 
recognised by the writ of assumpsit as enforceable, but the promise had to be accompanied by 
consideration. A promise to gift was never considered as enforceable. The writs which predated 
assumpsit did not enforce a gift or a promise, let alone a promise to gift. 
The term consideration emerged by the end of the sixteenth century in the context of "the facts 
or circumstances which must be proved in order to make a promise enforceable by this action 
(assumpsit)."84
                                                     
     82 J.W. Carter & D.J. Harland, Contract Law in Australia, 2nd ed., Butterworths, Sydney, 1991, p.7. 
  The role of a promise was largely evidentiary rather than substantive as it was to 
become. The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw a departure from consideration being 
driven by the common law procedural forms, and instead being viewed as an indication of 
evidentiary valuation that the parties intended their agreement to be enforced by the law. Sir 
William Holdsworth identifies Lord Mansfield as the prime mover that put consideration in this 
     83 Nude pact or nudum pactum in Roman law means unenforceability of an agreement for reasons such as a lack 
of lawful "cause", as consideration was not necessary element of a civil contract. In English law it has been used to 
denote an agreement that failed for lack of consideration. Refer to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and 
Phrases, 5th ed. London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986. 
     84 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1973, Vol.8, p.7. 
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new context and made theoretical space for moral and conscientious obligations to be enforced 
by the law in their own right rather than some twisting of theory to find conventional 
consideration to support an agreement85. Lord Mansfield's decisions86 were followed as 
accepted doctrine until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. If Mansfield's line of 
reasoning had been followed, English law may well have developed a position similar to the 
American law.87
 
 It had been set free of the formalism of consideration and perceived 
consideration as evidence of reliance, but not the exclusive indicia of contractual intention. 
This was not to be, as in the nineteenth century the procedural origins of consideration were 
recalled and reimposed on contract law. The cases of Eastwood v. Kenyon88 and Thomas v. 
Thomas89 were to reaffirm that consideration was not to be understood as merely evidence of a 
bargain, but "as a compendious word which summed up the conditions which the plaintiff must 
satisfy before he could succeed in indebitatus or in special assumpsit."90 Denman CJ., offered 
reasons other than the proper application of precedent for the decision in Eastwood v. Kenyon. 
He noted that the Lord Mansfield's reasoning would in the ultimate lead to annihilation of "the 
necessity for any consideration at all, inasmuch as the mere fact of giving a promise creates a 
moral obligation to perform it."91 This would result in "mischievous consequences to society" in 
that suits would be multiplied and temptations to executors would be increased.92 In the case of 
Thomas v. Thomas a few years later, symbolic consideration was accepted by Denman CJ on the 
grounds that it "shews a sufficient legal consideration quite independent of the moral feeling."93 
Patterson J. subscribed to the same sentiment saying that one ought not to "confound 
consideration with motive."94
 
  
The promise given for consideration was all that was needed, it was itself the source of the 
contractual duty and it no longer depended on some pre-existing duty. Atiyah comments that 
                                                     
     85 ibid, pp.25-34. 
     86 See Trueman v. Fenton 2 Cowp. 544; 98 E.R. 1232, Hawkes v. Saunders 1 Cow. 289; 98 E.R. 1091; Slade v. 
Morley (1603) 4 Co. Rep. 926; 76 E.R.1074, and Martyn v. Hind (1776) 2 Cow. 447; 98 E.R. 1174. 
     87 Holdsworth, Vol.3, p.42. 
     88 (1840) 11 Ad. and E. 438; 113 E.R. 482. 
     89 (1842) 2 Q.B. 851; 114 E.R. 330. 
     90 Holdsworth, Vol.8, p.38. 
     91 Eastwood v. Kenyon at p.450. 
     92 Eastwood v. Kenyon at p.450. 
     93 Thomas v. Thomas at p.859. 
     94 Thomas v. Thomas at p.860. 
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once a promise itself independently was considered as consideration, "it now became difficult to 
see why a gratuitous promise was not binding."95 He does not go on to explain this puzzle. In 
1854 the Mercantile Law Commission contemplated the abolition of the doctrine.96
 
 However as 
we have seen the English law never made the transition to permitting the enforcement of 
gratuitous promises. 
The rise of formalism and the decline in the influence of equity was a general trend in most areas 
of the law at this time, not just isolated to consideration. Atiyah posits that formalism was 
encouraged then by the case load pressure on the judiciary.97 This encouraged rule-utilitarianism 
where the judges sought "to search for fixed principles which would govern large numbers of 
cases without too close inquiry into the facts, and with the danger, therefore, which the 
individual decision might be (or anyhow, might seem) hard and perhaps unjust."98
                                                     
     95 Atiyah, p.452. 
  It was 
simple, if there was consideration there was a contract. There was no need for the court to weigh 
up facts to decide on reliance, serious intention or motive. This is supported by Markesinis' 
comment that: 
     96 Second Report, (1854-5) H.C.Parliamentary Papers, xviii. 664, 678. 
     97 As noted above this was one of the reasons given by C.J. Denman for the decision in Eastwood v. Kenyon 
(Refer to footnote Error! Bookmark not defined. above) and also mentioned by L.J. Atkin, in Balfour v. Balfour 
([1912] 2 KB 571 at 579 and refer footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.) In 1846 there were only 15 common 
law judges in the whole of England. (Atiyah, p.390). 
     98 Atiyah p.392. 
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 Consideration . . . was devised by commercially-minded lawyers at a time when they 
were anxious to escape from their formalistic medieval laws and expand their law of 
contracts. Assumpsit provided the means for expansion while consideration ensured 
that it remained under control.99
 
 
The formalism of the Anglo-australian judiciary in this area remains entrenched to this today.100 
In neither jurisdiction has the constructive trust nor promissory estoppel been developed to 
mitigate the effect of a strict doctrine of consideration and the Australian courts are perhaps even 
more tentative on these doctrines than the English.101
 
 In summary, history reveals that the 
personal actions on which the formative writs of contract were based did not include gratuitous 
transfers, unlike the Roman law. The assumptions flowing from freedom of contract are 
commercially orientated, not based on morally enforceable obligations. The free market 
intellectual theory had little to say about gratuitous transactions in the nineteenth century and 
judges need not address the issue as according to ancient precedent it was of no concern to the 
law what a person may do voluntarily. The continental law based on Roman law developed 
"causa" which did not draw a distinction between bargains and gratuitous transfers. The 
American judges altered the received English common law by extending the theory of 
consideration. They finally recognised the social utility and public policy of enforcing gratuitous 
promises by moving to the position that consideration was merely an evidentiary element of 
reliance. Despite prolific English academic commentary to alter the law such as Holdsworth, 
 There is, it seems to me, good sense in Lord Mansfield's view that consideration 
should be treated, not as the sole test of the validity of a simple contract, but simply 
as a piece of evidence which proves its conclusion.102
 
  
The judicial use of consideration to free contracts from medieval law, but still control the law's 
scope was crucial to the development of contract law. It has long outlived its restricting function 
and reform has never been achieved. 
                                                     
     99 B.S. Markesinis, `Cause and Consideration: a Study in Parallel', Cambridge Law Journal, 1978, Vol.37, pp.53-
75 at 55. 
     100 Evidenced by the case of Beaton v McDivitt op. cit., refer text accompanying footnote Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
     101 Re Rose [1952] Ch. 499 (see footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.) does appear to have been accepted in 
Australia. 
     102 Holdsworth op cit p.47. 
 
 
 24 
Functional rationalism 
 
Not all find the historical critique of the apparent non-facilitation of gratuitous promises 
convincing. Fuller103 and Posner104
 
 have argued that the common law's treatment of gifts serves 
a proper function in regulating society's affairs in a deliberate rational economic paradigm. 
Fuller raises several arguments about why the common law does not enforce gratuitous 
promises. First, the gratuitous transfer is not an exchange "which conduces to the production of 
wealth and the division of labour," nor is there either reliance on the promise by the donee nor 
unjust enrichment.105 Fuller and Posner contend it is not the place of the law to intervene in such 
relationships. Posner gives the example of a man promising to take a woman to dinner and 
reneging.106
 
 He argues that in such a situation the most effective remedies to the injured party 
are those outside the legal system. He says,  
 ... the real reason for the law's generally not enforcing gratuitous promises is not a 
belief, which would be economically unsound, that there is a difference in kind 
between the gratuitous and the bargained-for promise, but an empirical hunch that 
gratuitous promises tend both to involve small stakes and to be made in family 
settings where there are economically superior alternatives to legal enforcement.107
 
 
Posner states the question as 
 
 whether it is economical for society to recognise a promise as legally enforceable 
thus requires a comparison of the utility of the promise to the promisor with the 
social cost of enforcing the promise.108
 
  
He comes to the conclusion that the case for the enforcement of gratuitous promises will 
generally be stronger the larger the promised transfer and if it is to be made over a period of time 
in instalments. Non-enforceability of gratuitous promises could tend to bias transfers excessively 
towards immediacy which would not allow the economic benefits of instalment gifts.109
                                                     
     103 L.L. Fuller, `Consideration and Form', Columbia Law Review 799, Vol.41, 1941, pp.799-824. 
  
     104 R.A. Posner, `Gratuitous Promises in Law and Economics', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.6, 1977, pp.411-
426. 
     105 Fuller, ibid, p.814. 
     106 Posner, op cit, p.50. 
     107 Posner, op cit, p.50-51. 
     108 ibid p.49. 
     109 R.A. Posner, `Gratuitous promises in Economics and Law 1977', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.6, pp.411-426. 
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Secondly, formalities are present in the common law to serve evidentiary and cautionary 
functions as well as to "canalise" transactions.110
 
 The evidentiary formalities permit cost 
effective determinations of the terms of the agreement and its existence, cautionary formalities 
serve to both warn the parties of the consequences of their contemplated actions and to give an 
indication to the judiciary that the parties deliberatively intended their pact. Channelling is the 
directing of parties into forms that the court can easily recognise and administer. 
The gratuitous promise differs from a bargain with consideration and these differences dictate a 
higher test of formality. The bargain is a form of tangible mutual exchange about which the law 
is comfortable in making the assumption that the parties wished to enforce the bargain. Further, 
it is socially undesirable not to enforce the bargain. They agree that this mutual and tangible 
bargain is not present in a gratuitous transfer. The promise is perceived not to be in response to a 
tangible benefit nor is the relationship mutual. Thus the law insists that formality be the actual 
delivery of the property to the donee, or execution of a formal deed under seal or symbolic 
consideration which is evidentiary and cautionary and canalised into a legal form which the 
parties know will be recognised by the courts. 
 
This argument has a logic which is compelling, symmetrical and self-contained. To ensure 
efficient administration of justice and avoid disputes over unintended gifts, the law provides a 
means whereby parties can place their gratuitous transfer on a formal basis. For these theorists 
the common law has reached an economically and socially rational solution in deciding what 
promises should be enforced by the law. 
 
Assessment of the Functional Rationalisation 
 
The economic functionalist approach which has dominated the debate about consideration and 
gratuitous promises for the last fifty years has recently been criticised in two American articles. 
Baron111 and Kull112
                                                                                                                                        
Further economic analysis has been made on the basis of Posner's article, see S. Shavell, `An economic Analysis of 
Altruism and Deferred Gifts', The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.20, 1991, pp.401-421. 
 both take to task the rational economic paradigm on the validity and 
appropriateness of the assumptions it makes. They assert that the functionalists justify existing 
rules by developing a rationale, rather than examining whether the rule is justified on realistic 
assumptions. It echoes Pound's observation of functionalism as "The rational is real and the real 
is rational. Hence it is futile to criticise legal institutions or attempt to improve them by 
     110 Fuller, op cit p.815. 
     111 J.B. Baron, `Gifts, Bargains, and Form', Indiana Law Journal, Vol.64, No.2, pp.155-203. 
     112 A. Kull, `Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.21, 1992, pp.39-65. 
 
 
 26 
legislation."113
 
 
Baron and Kull hint at a redefinition of the old functionalists' assumptions which would reform 
the law into performing a greater facilitative role which is attune to contemporary societal and 
public policy requirements. This section first examines the criticisms of functionalists' 
assumptions and then develops the shape of the law based on modified assumptions about 
society, human behaviour and the need for facilitation of gratuitous property transfers. 
 
One of the basic assumptions that the functionalists made was that gratuitous transfers were of 
little economic importance. Fuller quoted from the French writer Bufnoir who described the gift 
as a `sterile transmission' which has been echoed by many other writers without giving a 
rigorous explanation of the sterility.114 The size of philanthropic transfer and the nonprofit 
sector, which has only recently been the subject of extensive academic investigation, shows that 
the economic contribution is significant. It can no longer be claimed, if it was ever true that 
"personal altruism is rare and from strangers even rarer" and promises prompted by affection are 
"seldom made."115
 
 Billig in reviewing Paragraph 90 of the American Restatement of Contracts 
noted,  
 The doctrine of consideration in contract law grew up in an age not faced with the 
legal problems arising out of charitable subscriptions totalling millions annually.116
 
 
The economic and social impact of modern philanthropy has been alluded to earlier in this paper 
and will not be repeated here.117 The argument that gifts have a wealth-redistribution effect, in 
that it goes to people who have more utility for the money than the donors and thus affects 
aggregate demand, has never been addressed by the functionalists.118
                                                     
     113 R. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History, Wm. W. Grant & Sons Inc., Florida, 1986 (reprint), p.66. 
 An example is the bald 
     114 Fuller, op cit p.814-815, citing Claude Bufnoir, Propriete et Contrat 487 (2d ed. 1924). R.A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of the Law, Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1972, at p.216 claims that there is no basis for the 
conclusion that, "... a transfer of money from a wealthy man to a poor one is likely to increase the sum of the two 
men's activities."; see also, M.A. Eisenberg, `Donative Promises', University of Chicago Law Review, Vol.47, 1979, 
pp.1-33 at 4; C.J. Goetz & R.E. Scott, `Enforcing Promises: An examination of the Basis of Contract', Yale Law 
Journal, Vol.89, 1980, pp.1261-1322 at 1266; C. Fried, Contract as Promise, at 36, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1981. 
     115 Baron op. cit., p.184 citing Stoljar, `A Rationale of Gifts and Favours', Modern Law Review, Vol.19, 1956, 
pp.237-254 at 249 and Havinghurst, `Consideration Ethics and Administration', Columbia Law Review, Vol.42, 
1942, pp.1-31 at 17; and Hays, `Formal Contracts and Consideration: A Legislative Program', Columbia Law 
Review, Vol.42, 1941, pp.849-862, at 852. 
     116T.C. Billig, op. cit., at p.476. 
 
     117 Refer to footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
     118 Hochman & Rodgers, `Pareto Optimal Redistribution', American Economic Review, Vol.59, pp.542-581 at 
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statement of Posner without support that, there is no basis for the conclusion that "transfer of 
money from a wealthy man to a poor one is likely to increase the sum of the two men's 
utilities."119 On this issue Baron120 employs the arguments of Langbein121
 
 - that wealth consists 
of more than commodities and that property can play an important role in society not because it 
directly generates material wealth or the division of labor, but because it gives other personal 
and social attributes. 
There is also a second related assumption which requires scrutiny. It is that in addition to the 
gratuitous transfer being economically trivial, there are relatively trivial social policy issues at 
stake. The economic and social policy of Thatcher and Reagan regimes, alluded to earlier in this 
paper, places a deal of emphasis on the charitable intermediary's reliance on philanthropic 
contributions which alters this assumption, if it were ever true. As Soljar puts it, "Among 
candidates for legal enforcement, neglected wives and children can surely have no lesser social 
priority than commercial purposes."122
 
 It is to be noted that the law would enforce the most 
trivial of commercial bargains that had very little economic impact. This proposition's basis is 
the parties' wisdom, not the courts, to decide on the desirability of making promises. Once the 
promise is made and intended to be legally binding, it is worth enforcing by the courts. The 
functionalists consistently use examples of trivial family or social arrangements, such as Posner's 
previously mentioned dinner invitation. The common law can effectively screen out such 
arrangements by the assumptions of contractual intention. The common law now catches the 
serious intended economically significant gratuitous transfers, that the functionalists do not refer, 
as well as socially trivial pacts. If the law takes the effort to enforce trivial bargains it should take 
the time to enforce serious, significant and relied on gratuitous promises. 
The argument of Fuller was that there was no reliance on gratuitous promises and no unjust 
enrichment which would cause the law to concern itself with such promises. There are certainly 
examples where the donee can be said not to rely on a gratuitous promise and at best expect or 
hope that the promise is kept, but this is not always the case. Professor Shattuck commenting on 
American law forcefully argues that, 
 
 Experience has proved that promisees all too frequently rely to their injury on 
gratuitous promises. It is useless to argue that they should not rely where there is no 
                                                                                                                                        
542-3. 
     119 R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1972, at p.216. 
     120 Baron, p.199-200. 
     121 Langbein, `The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission', Michigan Law Review, 
Vol.86, 1988, pp.722-751. 
     122 `Enforcing Benevolent Promises', Sydney Law Review, Vol.12, 1989, pp.17-39 at 20. 
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consideration for the promise. The uncontrovertible fact is that they do rely. .... 
Many courts voicing, we believe, a sound and current ethical opinion, have chosen 
to put the risk of such reliance on the promisor. He is bound to make no promises 
which are calculated to induce injurious reliance, on pain of responsibility for the 
consequences.123
 
 
As the previously noted American cases illustrate, donees may rely on a promise to start 
constructing buildings, programs of assistance and other donors may rely on a significant gift to 
also contribute and unjust enrichment can be imagined in the donor's undeserved boost in 
community reputation, personal satisfaction, and the other benefits of altruism.124
 
 At any rate 
commercial promises do not need to show reliance or unjust enrichment to be enforced. 
The legal difference between a gratuitous and commercial promises is also explained by the 
necessity of the law to reduce the costs of enforcement. The characteristics of normal human 
behaviour in relation to gratuitous promises make them relatively expensive to enforce 
compared to a commercial bargain. Unless the evidentiary, cautionary and channelling 
safeguards were present, then the relative cost of enforcing such gratuitous promises would 
outweigh the social benefits. Kull and Baron examine in detail the assumptions on which this 
argument rest and conclude that the assumptions are not as self evident as they initially appear. 
Once these assumptions are replaced there is little difference between commercial promises and 
gratuitous promises. 
 
The first assumption is that an alleged gratuitous promise is more difficult to ascertain than a 
commercial promise.125
 
 As Kull points out, 
 A plaintiff who attempts to recover on the basis of a promise that is a figment of his 
imagination, in the absence of either objective proof or corroborating 
circumstances, is unlikely to succeed; and the difficulty is the same whether he has 
imagined a bargain promise or a gift.126
 
 
The law is capable of dealing with difficult situations involving the determination of a person's 
intent or state of mind (murder), emotional state (undue influence, duress, automatons), or intent 
of voluntary dispositions (relation back doctrine of voluntary settlements in insolvency or 
                                                     
     123 W.L. Shattuck, `Gratuitous promises - a new writ?', 1937, Michigan Law Review, Vol.35, pp.908-945 at 
pp.942-943. 
     124 See text accompanying footnote Error! Bookmark not defined. and following. 
     125 Mechem, op. cit., p.349. 
     126 Kull, op. cit., p.53. 
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disposal of property in the face of a family law division of property). It seems that the law could 
adequately deal with deciding which gratuitous promises it should enforce on the basis of 
reliance and positive intent. 
 
A related corollary to this assumption is that solemn writing in the form of a deed under seal is 
necessary as evidence for a gratuitous promise. Are donors, donees and witnesses of gratuitous 
promises more prone to perjury, fraud or misunderstanding than commercial transactions? Does 
the absence of consideration or a sealed deed in a transaction consistently point to perjury, fraud 
or rash promises? These assumptions do not seem plausible when stated so bluntly and the 
historical explanation of a slow reforming formalist court seems a more cogent reason for the 
policy of the common law. 
 
The second assumption is that gratuitous promises are more likely to be made in highly 
emotional states which causes imprudence or carelessness and donors ought to be protected from 
this undue influence or their own failings.127 The statement of Kirby P. in Beaton v. McDivitt is 
illustrative of the centuries old judicial disposition, "People make foolish and ill considered 
promises to confer gifts and other benefits to others."128  But how does this differ from a bidding 
duel at an auction, the emotion of a takeover duel for a corporation, or even the more 
commonplace emotive advertising campaign? The law does not offer such encompassing 
protection in commercial matters. The protections which are offered by statute such as the 
Statute of Frauds129 and Trade Practices Act130 make no distinction between commercial and 
gratuitous promises. Unless this assumption is borne out, such conduct should be left to the 
established standards of duress and undue influence.131
 
 
Baron examines sociological evidence as to the motives of donors and donees in areas such as 
blood and kidney donations and the anthropological nature of gifts.132
                                                     
     127 Baron, op. cit., p.169, Kull, op. cit., p.53. 
 She makes the case that 
donors are not overly impulsive despite family pressures for an organ donation and gifts can be 
viewed sociologically as mutual transactions, just as bargains are viewed. As Baron admits there 
is still much work to be done by sociologists in this area, but it does throw a good deal of doubt 
on the way that functionalists have constructed their reality. 
     128 (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 169. 
     129 For example, Property Law Act (Qld) 1974-1990, Sections 10-12. 
     130 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). See also the case of Peter Geoffrey Webber Clarke v. New Concept Import 
Services Pty Ltd (1982) A.T.P.R. 40-264 which was to the effect that a good of no commercial value or a gift is 
included in the consumer protection provisions of the Act. 
     131 Refer to text accompanying footnote Error! Bookmark not defined. and following. 
     132 Baron, op. cit., pp.175-178 & 194-198. 
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Another argument of the judiciary for centuries, is that liberalisation would mean an 
overwhelming number of claims being brought before the courts.133 In America where such 
matters can be brought before the courts there has not been the feared explosion and clogging of 
the judicial system with hearing such matters. The fact that the law will enforce such gratuitous 
transfers does not mean that recourse will be had to the courts to enforce every or even a 
substantial number of transfers. The costs of litigation act as an effective threshold to ensure that 
only substantial cases reach the courts in the vast majority of instances.134
 
 
The market model also assumes the sovereignty of the consumer, where the consumer's choices 
ultimately dominate the direction of the market. Where the consumer is sovereign,  
the ideal market will only maximise that which is worth maximising and this sovereignty is the 
embodiment of individual freedom. The previous discussion of Anglo-australian law has shown 
graphically that the consumer of a gratuitous transfer (donee) has scarcely any remedy, power or 
influence in the gratuitous transaction. The market model of gratuitous transfers must either cast 
the donor as the "consumer" of some altruistic emotion or other usually intangible benefit, thus 
conflating the role of supplier and consumer into the one individual.135
 
 The donee (as defined in 
this work) has no sovereignty in the transaction. Ought not in the ideal market the ultimate 
consumer of the tangible property, the donee, be given some power in the market as a quid pro 
quo consumer is?  
The functionalist writers over the last half century have sought to explain the English law's rules 
of consideration as part of a rational schema of efficiency on assumptions that appear not to be 
as self-evident as proposed by such writers. Pound's observation of functionalism as "The 
rational is real and the real is rational. Hence it is futile to criticise legal institutions or attempt to 
improve them by legislation" serves to underline the fatal flaw of functional analysis.136
 
 
The historical analysis of the development of the law's policy on gratuitous transfers provides a 
plausible explanation for the current legal position.  The functionalists are notable for their lack 
of historical analysis.137
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 The obvious point appears to have escaped its proponents (functionalists) that much 
of the common law during the nineteenth century was strongly influenced by laissez 
faire economics.  It should therefore not come as a surprise when simple market 
economics can `explain' this body of law.138
 
 
The functionalist assumptions are being challenged and scrutinised. Many of them fall short of 
the mark as a basis for the rationalisation of the present state of the law and require to be 
challenged if new social needs are to be accommodated. Baker concludes that, 
 
 The economic analysis, although a failure as a guide to either welfare or freedom, 
may codify the basis and dominant ideology, the common sense, of the historical 
period in which common law developed. As increased awareness and better 
understanding of `that' common sense leads us to the conclusion that sometimes it is 
nonsense, we need to develop a new understanding as to how law can be used to 
structure the social arena in a way that promotes human welfare and human 
sovereignty."139
 
 
It is to this task that we turn in the facilitation of human welfare and sovereignty through 
gratuitous transfers. 
 
The new functionalism - facilitation 
 
This paper has argued so far that the formalism which engulfed the English judiciary in the 
nineteenth century prevented the development of consideration outside the strictures placed on it 
by its origins in ancient personal forms of writs. The ancient writs did not recognise voluntary 
promises or even assist in the completion of incomplete voluntary transfers. Neither the Anglo-
australian development of promissory estoppel nor constructive trusts has provided a solution to 
the issue of the doctrine of consideration being diametrically opposed to enforcing gratuitous 
promises.  
                                                     
     138 C.G. Veljanovski, "The Economic Approach to Law:  A Critical Introduction", British Journal of Law and 
Society, Vol.7, No.2, 1980, pp.158-193 at p.184. 
     139 C.W. Baker, `The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.5, No.1, 
1975, pp. 3-48 at pp.47-48. 
 
If one role of the law is to provide facilitation of socially useful transactions, then on the 
arguments that have been made that philanthropic transfers are socially useful, they ought to be 
facilitated by the law. The question that needs to be pondered is, is the nineteenth century 
notions of commercial life which judges applied to gift transactions appropriate to the realities of 
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emerging social welfare regime? It is proposed that a functionalist position driven not by 
legitimising the present legal position, but seeking the function that the law ought to fulfil is 
appropriate for the modern welfare state. If the law is to serve functions that facilitate useful 
social transactions, then what is the role of the law? 
 
Coote in an extensive treatise examining the essence of contract, constructs a new perception of 
the doctrine of consideration.140
 
 He theorises that promises can be classified by levels of 
intended or assumed obligation. The appropriate criterion for the legal enforcement of promises 
is the assumptions of the parties concerning legal enforcement. He posits, 
 What each party is seen to have bargained for is the assumption, by the other, of 
reciprocal legal obligation to him or her. Those assumptions are the consideration 
each provides for the other."141
 
 
This echoes Shattuck who perceptively wrote in 1937, 
 
 In a climate of opinion which attaches obligation to the mere act of making a 
promise, the promisor who promises a gift and the man (943) who makes a business 
promise are indistinguishable; it is the act of promising which is significant. But in 
Anglo-American law "consideration" has for centuries been an additional element 
of significance.142
 
 
Although Coote does not specifically deal with the issue of gratuitous promises, his principle of 
contractual enforcement is equally applicable, "The enquiry should be what obligations were 
undertaken by the promisor as that undertaking should have been understood by a reasonable 
person in the position of the promisee."143
 
  Such a proposition may be an appropriate basis for 
the enforcement of gratuitous promises. 
Conclusion 
 
The changing welfare state is increasingly reliant on charitable intermediaries to replace the state 
as a direct welfare provider, funded by the state, clients and public philanthropy. Cost savings 
available to intermediaries through such devices as voluntary labour and philanthropic transfers 
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of property are part of the state's strategy. The focus of this paper is to determine the level of 
legal facilitation of inter vivos gratuitous transfers. 
 
In summary, the Anglo-australian law tolerates inter vivos gratuitous transactions, but does not 
recognise that donees have any rights, apart from refusing the transfer of property. This is taken 
to the extent of refusing to assist a donee to perfect their title even when the intention of the 
donor was unequivocal and the defect is minor and technical. The courts refuse to recognise 
motives that could not be reduced to some commercial value. This could be overcome by a sham 
mutual bargain involving symbolic consideration or "channelling" the activity into the form of a 
deed under seal. But with social or domestic relationships, even if there was a mutual bargain, 
(sham or otherwise) the courts presume that the agreement is not legally enforceable. The late 
concession of equity was to invent a constructive trust to facilitate the gratuitous transfer. 
Promissory estoppel used to broaden the facilitation of commercial transactions has been closed 
to assisting gratuitous transfers in direct contrast to American developments. 
 
The law, economic functionalist and legal scholars are caught in a conceptual web of the 
nineteenth century. Economic functionalists are locked into an elaborate historical tautology 
based on discredited assumptions about gratuitous transfers. As was indicated in the introduction 
to this paper there is a division of legal scholarship which reflects a legal division between 
equity and common law (contract). The Anglo-australian charitable intermediary scholars have 
confined themselves to equity issues and have largely failed to analyse the relevance of the 
common law's hostility to gratuitous transfers affecting the dynamics of the charitable 
intermediary. It is contended that there are theoretical and practical benefits from viewing direct 
gratuitous transfers as a part of charity law. The analytical benefits are an appreciation of the 
legal restrictions placed on intermediaries and an identification of judicial policy towards 
gratuitous conduct that has not facilitated philanthropic transactions. This will assist in 
developing an explanation of the failure of charitable intermediaries to be a facilitative legal 
form for the delivery of gratuitous property transfers. Direct gratuitous transfers are just one 
example of defective legal infrastructure of charitable intermediaries.144
 
 
The nineteenth century battle between equity courts and the common law courts about contract 
and consideration was won by the common law. The rise of the formalism of the common law 
and the decline in the influence of equity was a general trend in most areas of the law at this 
time, not just isolated to consideration. This formalism later rationalised by functional 
economics is no longer appropriate for the policy direction of the modern welfare state. The 
functionalist explanation of the state of the common law is not persuasive as the assumptions 
that it rests on are not now, if they ever have been, appropriate to the role philanthropy is 
expected to play in a welfare state.  
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The Anglo-Australian legal environment is distinctly hostile to the facilitation of gratuitous 
transfers and one can but speculate on the effect that this has had on philanthropic transfers.145
 
 
The function of the law in relation to inter vivos gratuitous property transfers should be to 
facilitate seriously made promises. The alteration of the law would have minimal adverse 
affects, (as has been the case in America) and requires only law reform which does not have to 
be supported for its implementation by any expensive temporary or permanent bureaucracy.  
Present ideology and public policy which was premised on the efficient operation of 
philanthropic transfers to sustain a contraction of government is clearly misplaced in relation to 
inter vivos gratuitous transfers. The rigidity of Anglo-australian law in this area is such that it has 
not taken into account (nor likely to in the foreseeable future), the altered policy direction or 
current social environment. The unprogressive and slow nature of common law precedent and 
the lack of attention by policy analysts to such law reform, places shackles on the nonprofit 
sector to generate gratuitous transfers of property. 
                                                     
     145 There appears to be no research which has quantified the cost of the barriers that the law places against the 
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